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ABSTRACT
This paper aims to provide a detailed demographic description of
poverty in Pakistan with an attempt to highlight those segments
of the poor who can be aided to transition out of extreme pov-
erty through appropriate policy measures. Data are collected from
the Household Integrated Economic Survey (HIES) for the years
1985–2016 and captures falling poverty, gender-wise division of
the employed and unemployed, type of employment (self-
employed, unpaid workers, employers, employees) by gender,
labour participation of vulnerable age groups, as well as
unemployed widows. The paper discusses the effectiveness of
conditional (CCT) and unconditional (UCT) cash transfer programs
across the world and using data indicators, highlights the appro-
priate target groups in need of such intervention in Pakistan. The
existing components of BISP are discussed, with policy recom-
mendations targeted to enhance its impact by focusing UCTs on
the most vulnerable segments. CCTs can be used to improve
health and education outcomes; given Pakistan’s lagging perform-
ance, illiteracy among youth, infant and maternal health are of
particular consideration. Cash transfers can be made conditional,
subject to regular health checkups for mothers and children and
mandatory school attendance to improve these outcomes. The
paper further suggests an extension of the program to provide
short-term financial relief to the temporarily unemployed.
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Despite inconsistent economic growth, Pakistan has made remarkable progress in
reducing poverty, particularly since 2002 (Figure 1). The share of people living below
the poverty line (as estimated by $1.25 per day) has declined from 64.7% in 1990 to
12.7% in 2010 while according to the official national poverty line, poverty has
declined from 25.5% in 1992 to 12.4% in 20101 (World Bank, 2015). The official fig-
ures for poverty in the country do not seem to follow a trend in line with its
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economic performance (Figure 1), indicating that there is no established relationship
between poverty and macroeconomic performance in Pakistan.
The fall in poverty despite poor growth is also substantiated by the World Banks
Human Development Index (HDI), which shows that Pakistan has made stable pro-
gress in terms of income levels, education, health and inequality (Figure 2).
As evident from the figures, reduction of poverty in Pakistan does not necessarily
follow its economic growth (Figure 1); for example, despite declining economic
growth between 2005 and 2010, the poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines
continued to fall from 50.4 in 2005 to 36.8 in 2010. Therefore, the answers for
Pakistan’s declining poverty do not lie in its economic growth; rather, the policies
introduced to mitigate poverty need to be examined for possible answers. Effective
public services are of paramount importance in reducing poverty (Joshi, 2008);
Figure 1. Economic Growth and Incidence of Poverty in Pakistan, 1998–2015.
Source: Economic Growth – Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan
Poverty Headcount – World Development Indicators, World Bank
Figure 2. HDI, Pakistan.
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank
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therefore it is essential to take into account the human development arising from the
provision of such public services, especially in the form of social safety nets.
Given that poverty alleviation in Pakistan does not appear to be directly linked to
economic growth, it is necessary to evaluate whether the fall in poverty is realised
across all segments of the country. Table 1 shares the average monthly income of the
highest and lowest 20% households in terms of income; the data show that the
income gap between the richest and poorest 20% households has increased over the
years. This suggests that despite declining poverty in the country, the poorest may
not be benefiting from this trend. So even though the median income levels are
increasing, it is possible that the income for the richest is growing more significantly
than that for the poor, widening the gap between them.
The apparent disconnect between economic growth and the fall in poverty leads to
the question, what policies have contributed to the decline of poverty in Pakistan. For
our research, we focus on the expansion of cash transfer programs. In recent years,
public spending on 17 pro-poor sectors has increased; the Benazir Income Support
Program (BISP) in particular has been a boost to the safety-net for the poor as an
unconditional cash transfer (UCT) program.
The use of social safety nets is increasing rapidly, with unconditional cash transfer pro-
grams being adopted in 40 countries in 2015, which is nearly twice the figure in 2010
(World Bank, 2015). In addition to UCTs, conditional cash transfers (CCTs) have also
gained traction and have been producing remarkable results in countries like India,
Brazil, Mexico and China. As the popularity of social safety nets increases across the
world, it is imperative that the programs are targeted towards the appropriate focus group
so as to maximise the efficiency of resources and have maximum impact at alleviat-
ing poverty.
Current literature suggests that that economic growth and poverty reduction do
not necessarily affect all income groups to the same extent and some of the poor are
presented with more opportunities than others (Ravallion, 2001). Given that countries
with lower inequality have more success in translating their economic growth into
poverty reduction, the rising income inequality is particularly concerning (Fosu,
2011). Therefore, while reducing overall poverty is an important objective, it is
imperative that the most vulnerable segments of the society are not overlooked dur-
ing the planning and implementation of social safety programs.
This paper attempts to outline the demographics of poverty in Pakistan and evalu-
ate how well the current cash transfer programs have been implemented in the coun-
try, providing grounds for improvement to the target demographics of cash transfer
Table 1. Income gap and average monthly income of upper 20% and lowest 20% households.
Years Upper 20% Lowest 20% Income Gap (PKR)
2004–2005 16,182 5,567 10,615
2005–2006 20,811 6,725 14,086
2007–2008 24,659 7,812 16,847
2010–2011 37,728 11,386 26,342
2011–2012 31,721 11,063 20,658
2013–2014 51,579 13,262 38,317
2015–2016 54,580 15,698 38,882
Source: Household Integrated Economic Survey, various years.
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programs. Section 1 discusses conditional and unconditional cash transfer programs
and the channels through which they affect poverty, Section 2 assesses Pakistan’s larg-
est cash transfer program and discusses the countries poverty demographics while
section 3 concludes.
2. Poverty and cash transfer programs
According to the World Bank, every country in the word has a minimum of one
social safety net program in place. From the 1.9 billion recipients of social safety pro-
grams, 44% receive transfers in-kind, 37% receive cash transfers while the remaining
19% receive fee-waivers (World Bank, 2015). In recent years, an increasing number
of countries have adopted cash transfer programs to support the poorest segment of
the population. Some of the most successful examples include the Dibao program in
China, Bolsa Familia in Brazil, and the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
(NREGA) in India.
Cash transfer programs provide financial assistance to poor households in the
form of cash. Under such programs, the effects of the program are only seen on the
target population, rather than at a national level (de Janvry & Sadoulet, 2006). For
countries with a large share of population living below the poverty line, effective
implementation of cash transfer programs can lead to the maximum fall in poverty
per unit of money transferred (de Janvry & Sadoulat, 2006). In 2014, 119 developing
countries had implemented at least one type of unconditional cash assistance pro-
gram, and 52 countries had conditional cash transfer programs for poor households
(Gentilini, Honorati, & Yemstov, 2014). As of 2017, the number of countries offering
cash transfer programs has increased to 149 (World Bank, 2017). Cash transfer pro-
grams have played a vital role in reducing the poverty headcount and the benefits of
such programs justify their cost to donors and taxpayers alike (Fiszbein & Schady,
2009). For example, in 2009 alone, Brazil’s Bolsa Famılia led to a decrease in poverty
headcount index between 12% and 18% (Higgins, 2012).
2.1. Conditional and unconditional cash transfers
Targeted cash transfer programs have received considerable attention from policy
makers and researchers, especially in terms of choosing the most appropriate pro-
grams. There are two kind of cash transfer programs: conditional (CCTs) and uncon-
ditional (UCTs). UCTs are typically less costly to implement than CCTs due to lesser
monitoring involved for the usage of funds (Haushofer & Shapiro, 2016). In the past,
UCTs have often been disregarded due to their image of being free ‘handouts’ and
reducing the incentive to work; however, this claim is not validated by research. In a
presence of cash transfer programs, expenditures on food consumption, health and
education are likely to increase, while there may be little to no effect on expenditure
on luxuries (Haushofer & Shapiro, 2016). Similarly, research suggests that uncondi-
tional cash transfers do not impact the spending on ‘taboo’ goods like alcohol and
cigarettes (Evans & Popova, 2014), which lessens the expected negative effects of
UCTs. Moreover, the presence of cash transfer programs does not seem to have any
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effect on the willingness to work of the recipients or the lack thereof (Banerjee,
Hanna, Kreindler, & Olken, 2017). UCTs have been successfully employed in various
countries across the world. One most successful example is that of Di Bao program
in China, which provides income support to households falling below a pre-deter-
mined income level.
Regardless of their conditionality, cash transfer programs produce better results as
compared to no cash transfer programs (Baird, Ferreira, €Ozler, & Woolcock, 2014).
However, evidence suggests that the impact of CCTs on human development is
greater, as compared to UCTs (Baird, Ferreira, €Ozler, & Woolcock, 2014). As com-
pared to in-kind transfers, cash transfer programs allow the parents greater freedom
in determining how to best allocate the money received towards the health and well-
being of their children (Miller & Neanidis, 2015). Typically, CCTs have two purposes:
(a) poverty alleviation through the cash transfer in the short run and (b) accumula-
tion of long-term human capital accumulation through health care and education in
the long run (Handa & Davis, 2006).
The existence of a cash transfer program, however, does not automatically result in
poverty reduction. For example, China’s Dibao program is one of the largest min-
imum income cash transfer schemes in the world, providing income support to poor
beneficiaries; however, literature suggests that it has not significantly reduced the
overall level of poverty in the country (Golan, Sicular, & Umapathi, 2017). When it
comes to making the decision between a CCT and a UCT, the end objectives need to
be kept in mind. When the goal is to improve human development, for example
through school enrolment or access to healthcare, CCTs may have greater impact.
For example, research shows that a dollar unit spent on a CCT is 8 times more effect-
ive than a dollar unit spent on a UCT (de Janvry, Sadoulet, Solomon, & Vakis, 2006).
In addition to improving education, CCTs also increase household consumption and
improve preventative healthcare (Hunter & Sugiyama, 2014; Rawlings & Rubio,
2005). However, the effect of CCTs on education may be contingent upon other fac-
tors. A study from Kenya suggests that unconditional cash transfers have strong
effects on schooling rates, but that the additional impact of making the cash pay-
ments conditional on school attendance is limited (Baird, McIntosh, & Ozler, 2011).
For example, Malawi and Burkina Faso have experienced positive results with CCTs
but Morocco does not exhibit any significant impact of cash transfer programs
(Baird, Ferreira, €Ozler, & Woolcock, 2014). Moreover, the increase in school attend-
ance rates do not necessarily translate to greater learning among children (Behrman,
Parker, & Todd, 2005; Baird et al., 2011).
For countries considering interventions through CCT programs, the disbursement
to funds needs to be transparent and the conditions of the program must be stated in
clear, concrete terms and results need to be monitored rigorously. Moreover, trans-
parency in implementation encourages learning, minimises corruption and ensures
that beneficiaries understand how the program works (Son, 2008).
2.2. Cash transfers and channels of poverty alleviation
Cash transfer programs have been widely praised for their success, particularly when
they are well implemented. When appropriately targeted, such programs have been
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observed to reduce the incidence of household poverty, as well as its intensity
(Molyneux, Jones, & Samuels, 2016). One of the primary criticisms of cash transfer
programs is the fact that such initiatives fail to create sustained means of livelihood
for recipients and there is a demand for such programs to be ‘transformative’ in
terms of bringing about long lasting changes (Molyneux, Jones, & Samuels, 2016).
The primary channel for cash transfer programs to reduce poverty is through their
impact on human development (World Bank, 2009) and literature over the years sug-
gests the same. The human development indicators include health, nutrition and edu-
cation (Cotto, 2018) as well as female empowerment and labour force participation.
For example, positive effects of cash transfers on children’s health and education out-
comes have been recorded in multiple studies (Cecchini & Madariaga, 2011, Arnold,
Conway, & Greenslade, 2011; Schady & Araujo, 2006; Son, 2008). The education out-
comes include enrolment, attendance and achievements in school (Son, 2008) while
health outcomes include immunisation, incidence of illness and sick days availed. The
nutrition outcomes include incidence of stunting and malnutrition amidst the recipi-
ent households.
Several studies have been also targeted to be more ‘gender-aware’ (Holmes &
Jones, 2013), and focus on empowering women by providing them with better oppor-
tunities. For example, the Estancias program in Mexico and the Bolsa Familia pro-
gram in Brazil provide subsidised childcare (creches) for women with children, while
the BISP program seeks to elevate the social status of women by making them the
primary beneficiary of payments in Pakistan.
3. Cash transfer programs and lessons from Pakistan
The Benazir Income Support Program (BISP) is a federal unconditional cash transfer
initiative by the Government of Pakistan, which attempts to reduce poverty and pro-
mote equitable distribution of wealth especially for the low-income groups. Started in
2008, the primary objective of the program was to provide a financial cushion to the
poor in the face of higher cost of food and fuel; it has since evolved into an income
support program for the poorest and most vulnerable segment. Under BISP, a dis-
bursement of PKR 1,500 per month is made to women from impoverished house-
holds on a quarterly basis; in 2008, each recipient household received PKR 1,000 per
month. Since its inception, BISP has gained international approval for its implemen-
tation, ranking at 5th internationally in terms of targeting performance (World
Bank, 2015).
To identify its target audience, BISP has adopted the ‘Poverty Scorecard’ instru-
ment developed by the World Bank, under which 7.7 million families have been iden-
tified and 5.7 million currently receive assistance across all provinces (‘Benazir
Income Support Programme’, 2018). Since 2011, BISP has used Proxy Means Test
(PMT) to access the poorest 15% of households (Ambler & De Brauw, 2017). The
PMT makes use of 23 variables taken from the PSLM and the cut off score is cur-
rently set at 16.17. However, exceptions may be made for poor households with a dis-
abled member, senior citizens and those with more than four children under 12.
Following reports of misappropriation of funds, the payment method was changed
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from conventional mail to ATM cards issued to women with valid CNICs in 2012.
Roughly 48% of the recipient households belong to the poorest quintile in the coun-
try (BISP, 2016).
At the time of its inception, BISP did not require households to make an effort to
invest in human or physical capital, which would hasten the transition out of poverty.
Hence, while the program does ease financial burden, it is likely that there would be
no progress towards the recipient households becoming self-sufficient. The effective
transition out of poverty for recipient households is also one of the benchmarks for
the success of social safety programs (Nayab & Farooq, 2014). Over the years, condi-
tional interventions have been introduced as a part of BISP in order to increase the
uptake of education and healthcare and to improve livelihoods, so that chances of
transitioning out of poverty are increased. However, these programs were later
scrapped by the succeeding government due to poor planning and monitoring in
2015 (Tanoli, 2016).
The impact evaluations of BISP show that at the very least, the program has led to
an increase in women empowerment in Pakistan (Ambler & De Brauw, 2017), which
is positively correlated with economic growth (Duflo, 2012). Women empowerment
is also reflected in the fact that BISP has led to an increase in female applications for
CNICs, whereas female registration was previously disproportionate to their actual
numbers, particularly in rural areas (Ghazdar, 2011). The increase in female registra-
tion means that women are more ‘visible’ to policy maker; in the absence of civil
registration, women lose access to basic healthcare, education and civil facilities,
which hinders them in exercising their rights and having any agency in decision mak-
ing (ADB, 2014). Since the inception of the program in 2008, 20 million women have
registered themselves for CNICs (Sahi, 2014). The identification of women as the pri-
mary recipient in a household means that the social perception of women is also
changing, leading to greater empowerment (Khan & Qutub, 2010). Moreover, assess-
ment of the program shows that it has been able to provide monetary relief to the
recipient households in terms of food and health expenditures are concerned (Nayab
& Farooq, 2014; Shehzad, 2011).
Despite its relative success, the program is not without its criticism. For example,
the program requires continued political support from future governments in order
to be effective, which is of some concern given the political nature of the name of the
program (Nayab & Farooq, 2014). However, the retention of the program and its
name even after change in government is a positive sign (Nabi, 2013). Additionally,
the different rates of disbursement among provinces may also be rooted in political
causes, rather than a difference in rates of deserving families. An ongoing concern
associated with cash transfers is that the recipients may develop long-term depend-
ence on government assistance, incurring an ongoing expenditure for governments
(McCord, 2009). The long term objective of cash transfer programs is to hasten the
transition out of poverty and two important components are receiving the payments
on time each time and knowing the amount of stipend in advance (Slater &
Farrington, 2009). This allows poor households to plan in advance and make the best
use of their resources. Late or missing payments may force the recipient households
to take credit from other sources and lose a proportion of their cash transfer in debt
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payment. BISP disburses its payment in quarterly instalments, which is supported by
existing research, which finds that small, regular cash transfers are mostly spent on
consumption expenditure but larger, lump sum cash transfers have a greater likeli-
hood of being used for productive activities (Farrington & Slater, 2009).
3.1. Present and future demographics for cash transfer programs
Table 1 shows that the incidence of poverty at the national poverty line has declined
in both urban and rural areas; in the last 18 years, poverty has declined by more than
half. Historically, poverty rates have been higher in rural areas, as compared to urban;
from 2011 to 2014, rural poverty has been nearly twice as high as urban poverty. To
encapsulate the urban-rural disparity, Table 2 shows the population trends and share
of urban population. The table shows that poverty in Pakistan has been declining
steadily, particularly post-2002. The incidence of poverty in urban areas has dropped
from 50 in 2001–2002 to 18.2 in 2014, while in rural areas it has declined from 70.2
in 2001–2002 to 35.6 in 2004. Urban poverty has declined by 63.6% between 2002
and 2014 while rural poverty has fallen by 50.5%; this shows that the fall in poverty
has been greater in urban areas.
The data indicate that poverty in rural areas is relatively higher and 60% of the
total population reside in rural areas (Table 3). Since 1985, the increase in share of
urban population has been gradual as more people emigrate to urban areas in search
of better livelihood. Given the historically high rates of poverty in rural areas, one
possible intervention is to target the unconditional cash transfers primarily towards
rural areas. Another possible model for Pakistan to adopt is that of India, with its
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), which provides 100 days of
waged labour to volunteer households in the form of unskilled manual labour. In the
event that applicants do not receive work within 15 days of application, they may
withdraw an unemployment allowance.
Since 2006, there have been small fluctuations in the unemployment figures for
Pakistan (Figure 3). Table 4 shows that despite having more male and female earners
per household, the poorest are still unable to transition out of poverty. This shows
Table 2. Incidence of poverty at national poverty line, rural and urban.
Year Total Urban Rural
1998–99 57.9 44.5 63.4
2001–02 64.3 50 70.2
2004–05 51.7 37.3 58.4
2005–06 50.4 36.6 57.4
2007–08 44.1 32.7 49.7
2010–11 36.8 26.2 42.1
2011–12 36.3 22.8 43.1
2013–14 29.5 18.2 35.6
Source: Household Integrated Economic Survey, various years.
Table 3. Share of urban population.
Year 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2016 2017 2018
URBAN POPULATION (%) 30.2 31.5 32.8 34.4 35.6 37.2 38.5 38.8 39.1 39.5
Source: Household Integrated Economic Survey, various years.
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that the poorest households also ‘work poor’, i.e., despite having a greater number of
earners per household, their household income still remains lower. The poor often
work in poor conditions, with long hours and hazardous conditions and low income
and employment stability (Mahmood, 2006). This is also substantiated by the data in
Table 4, which shows relatively low figures for employment in the lowest 20% of the
population; UCTs may be expanded to include a component that is targeted towards
the unemployed, by providing financial support to those out of jobs for a limited
number of days.
One possible avenue to explore is the introduction of cash stipends for workers that
are temporarily unemployed. The benefits of such a program would be: (a) financial sup-
port to the poorest in times of greater financial hardship and (b) the time limit of cash
transfers ensures that recipients continue to actively seek employment. The NREGA pro-
gram in India provides wages for 100 days; similarly, Pakistan may adopt a model that
provides unemployment benefits for up to 3months or 90days, providing job seekers
with ample time to search for employment while receiving financial assistance.
Furthermore, the incentives can be modified for widows (Table 11), handicapped and
those living in extreme poverty with a large number of dependents, who fall close to BISP
cut-off poverty score but are not current beneficiaries under BISP. This would help avoid
the problem of benefits being disbursed to the same recipients under different schemes.
Another example from India is that of its targeted unconditional cash transfers for
the elderly and the widows, known as National Social Assistance Program (NSAP).
NSAP has proven to outperform India’s Public Distribution System (PDS) which pro-
vides subsidised food to the poor, as they are highly targeted and have lower leakages
(Dutta, Howes, & Murgai, 2010). The data for widows as a portion of the population
Figure 3. Unemployment in Pakistan.
Source: Pakistan Bureau of Statistics
Table 4. Percentage of employed persons and earners per household in upper 20% and lowest
20% of population.
Years
Percentage of Employed Persons Earners Per Household
Upper 20% Lowest 20% Upper 20% Lowest 20%
Total M F Total M F M F M F
2005–2006 20.31 17.05 3.26 18.79 13.76 5.03 1.38 0.28 1.78 0.65
2007–2008 20.46 17.36 3.1 18.62 13.6 5.02 1.35 0.25 1.72 0.64
2010–2011 21.58 18.21 3.37 17.43 13.47 3.96 1.33 0.26 1.5 0.46
2011–2012 20.12 17.07 3.05 18.92 13.29 5.63 1.27 0.24 1.61 0.68
2013–2014 19.8 16.48 3.32 19.15 12.87 6.28 1.25 0.26 1.59 0.77
2015–2016 19.95 10.26 9.69 19.05 7.17 11.88 1.26 0.28 1.55 0.75
Source: Household Integrated Economic Survey (HIES), various years.
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and the workforce are shown in Table 5. Table 6 shows that a roughly 5% of the
labour force comprises of individuals aged 65 years and above.
The data show that widows account for 2.51% of the total population and form
only 0.71% of the labour force; this implies that most widows are not active earners
for their families and may rely on the pensions from their deceased husbands for
income, as well as other odd jobs. Individuals aged over 65 years form nearly 5% of
the labour force. Following India’s model, cash transfers may be provided to the eld-
erly (i.e., 60 years of age) that fall below the national poverty line. The elderly can be
further divided into age brackets, such that an 80-year-old would receive higher bene-
fits than a 65-year-old. Similarly, unconditional funds may also be provided to wid-
ows that fall below the national poverty line up to the age that they qualify for the
pension scheme, such that there is no duplication of recipients.
Unconditional cash transfers may also be provided to disabled persons living below
the poverty line. Given the effectiveness of CCTs in targeting health and education
outcomes, conditional cash transfers may be introduced for the appropriate demo-
graphics. In the past few years, BISP has evolved to include conditional cash transfer
components; however, they were scrapped due to lack of proper design and ineffect-
ive monitoring. In light of the data presented in the paper, these components can be
improved and implemented in such way that reduces poverty at the same time as
encouraging human development. One aspect that can be targeted using CCTs is
Pakistan’s rapid population growth (Table 7).
Since 1955, the population of Pakistan has increased fourfold, with particularly
high increases in population in the years 1980–1990 (Table 7). After 1990 however,
there has been a gradual decline in population growth, as fertility rates have declined.
Table 5. Percentage of widows by rural and urban population and employment status.
Years
Population Labour force Employed Unemployed
Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban
2008–2009 2.57 2.85 0.58 0.39 0.46 0.28 0.12 0.12
2009–2010 2.59 2.73 0.54 0.36 0.43 0.25 0.11 0.12
2010–2011 2.68 2.8 0.58 0.35 0.48 0.24 0.11 0.11
2014–2015 2.51 2.57 0.71 0.28 0.67 0.24 0.04 0.04
Source: Labour Force Survey, various years.
Table 6. Workers aged 65þ in the workforce.
Rural population Urban population
Years Total Male Female Total Male Female
2001–2002 5.31 3.2 2.11 4.12 2.39 1.73
2003–2004 5.67 3.42 2.25 4.23 2.32 1.91
2005–2006 5.24 3.09 2.16 4.07 2.36 1.71
2006–2007 4.85 2.87 1.98 4.05 2.36 1.69
2007–2008 4.78 2.77 2.01 3.71 2.18 1.52
2008–2009 4.8 2.77 2.03 4.12 2.42 1.7
2009–2010 4.99 2.88 2.11 3.84 2.25 1.59
2010–2011 4.78 2.69 2.09 3.93 2.29 1.64
2012–2013 4.83 2.78 2.05 3.78 2.16 1.62
2013–2014 4.77 2.75 2.02 3.71 2.12 1.59
2014–2015 4.59 2.62 1.97 3.67 2.1 1.57
Source: Labour Force Survey, various years.
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The share of urban population has also increased to 39.5% in 2018, as more and
more people migrate to the cities in search of better job opportunities and quality of
life. The median age of Pakistan is only 22.7 years; meaning that there are a large
number of youth in the country that require education, skills training and livelihoods.
This means that there are a large number of dependents in the country, as illustrated
by Figure 4.
Moreover, Table 8 shows that the poorest 20% of households are nearly twice the
size of richest 20%, in terms of number of family members. So not only do the poor
earn less in terms of income but they also have more mouths to feed, increasing the
pressure on the earners of the household.
Table 7. Population demographics.
Year Population Annual change in population Median age Fertility rate
1955 40,424,296 1.49% 20.2 6.6
1960 44,908,293 2.13% 20.2 6.6
1965 50,845,221 2.51% 20.2 6.6
1970 58,090,759 2.70% 19.3 6.6
1975 66,787,901 2.83% 18.6 6.6
1980 78,068,144 3.17% 18.5 6.6
1985 92,219,488 3.39% 18.6 6.44
1990 107,678,614 3.15% 18.5 6.3
1995 122,829,148 2.67% 18.6 5.67
2000 138,523,285 2.43% 19.2 4.99
2005 153,909,667 2.13% 20.2 4.23
2010 170,560,182 2.08% 21.4 3.98
2015 189,380,513 2.12% 22.5 3.72
2016 193,203,476 2.02% 22.7 3.65
2017 197,015,955 1.97% 22.7 3.65
2018 200,813,818 1.93% 22.7 3.65
Source: Household Integrated Economic Survey, various years.
Figure 4. Dependency Ratio in Pakistan.
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank
Table 8. Average household size of upper and lowest 20% population.








Source: Household Integrated Economic Survey, various years.
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In Pakistan, the minimum age of employment is 15 years (Bureau of International
Labour Affairs, 2017), with highest recorded incidence of child labour in Sindh. The
large number of dependents is not only burdensome in terms of income but also
gives rise to further issues. For example, a large number of children between the ages
of 10 to 14 years are an active part of Pakistan’s labour force, accounting for nearly
20% of the total labour force (Table 9); this figure is remarkably high, given the
many laws to curb child labour.
Given the large number of youth in the country (64% population under 30 years of
age) and prevalent low literacy rates (Table 10), improvement of provision of educa-
tion and school attendance is of particular importance. The Waseela-e-Taleem initia-
tive of BISP can be expanded to target the issue of growing population, stagnant
literacy rates and child labour. An increase in the monthly stipend per child per
month may be considered given the importance of the objective; the current stipend
of PKR 250 may be too low to provide any real incentive for parents to enrol their
children in schools. This point is particularly valid if the wages earned by the children
are greater than the compensation provided by the program. Existing research also
shows that cash transfers reduce children’s participation in the labour force (De
Hoop & Rosati, 2014); conditional cash transfers particularly labelled as an education
fund have produced desirable results in Mexico (Benhassine, Devoto, Duflo, Dupas,
& Pouliquen, 2015). Strong incentives for school enrolment not only mitigate the
issue of child labour but will also increase the probability of these children transition-
ing out of poverty, at the same time as increasing human capital. Moreover, the
Table 9. Underage participants in labour force (10–14 years).
Rural population Urban population
Years Total Male Female Total Male Female
2001–2002 18.72 10 8.72 18.13 9.4 8.73
2003–2004 19.02 10.03 8.99 17.38 8.78 8.6
2005–2006 19.2 10.17 9.03 17.04 8.79 8.25
2006–2007 19.65 10.59 9.06 17.02 8.91 8.11
2007–2008 19.69 10.64 9.05 17.25 9.02 8.23
2008–2009 19.65 10.59 9.06 17.02 8.91 8.11
2009–2010 19.46 10.54 8.92 16.91 8.96 7.95
2010–2011 19.65 10.68 8.97 16.65 8.66 7.99
2012–2013 18.53 9.92 8.61 16.42 8.42 8
2013–2014 18.81 10.09 8.72 16.4 8.72 7.68
2014–2015 19.07 10.32 8.75 17.18 8.93 8.25
Source: Household Integrated Economic Survey, various years.











Source: World Bank WDI.
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provision of education may include both conventional and vocational education, so
that the families may choose a route that best serves their needs, while also equipping
the children with necessary skills.
Along with high fertility rates and rapid population growth (Table 7), Pakistan
also has high infant mortality rates compared to its regional counterparts (Tables 11
and 12).
Pakistan’s performance in improving infant mortality rate (61.2 per 1000 births, as
compared to 26.9 in Bangladesh and 32 in India in 2017) has been dismal, compared
to its counterparts at the same level of income (Table 12). To build upon the idea of
increasing the provision of healthcare services and ensuring that the poor have means
to those services, regular health check-ups may be incorporated as a condition for
funds across all provinces. This method of conditional cash transfers has produced
favourable results in terms of health outcomes under the Bolsa Familia in Brazil and
Oportunidades in Mexico.
To counter the high fertility rates in the country, discontinued Waseela-e-Sehat
may be modified and relaunched to make disbursements of funds to women condi-
tional on regular health checkups and regular vaccinations for children. This is in
contrast to the previous working of this program, under which it sought to disburse
medical coverage of up to PKR 25,000 per family per annum, targeted towards fami-
lies that cannot afford medical expenses otherwise. Rather than provide a lump sum
coverage, this approach allows for more focus on infant and maternal health.
As evident from the success in Brazil, the adoption of such an initiative would not
only improve the provision of preventive healthcare but also lead to better health for
mothers and children alike. The maternal health component of the program can also
be expanded to include an additional incentive for household with less than four chil-
dren, for example, which may translate into a consideration for families planning to
expand further.
Table 12. Infant mortality rates.
Years Bangladesh India Pakistan
2007 45.6 51.6 76.9
2008 43.3 49.5 75.6
2009 41.1 47.4 74.2
2010 38.9 45.3 72.8
2011 36.9 43.2 71.3
2012 35 41.1 69.7
2013 33.2 39.1 68.1
2014 31.5 37.2 66.4
2015 29.8 35.3 64.6
2016 28.3 33.6 62.9
2017 26.9 32 61.2
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.
Table 11. Population growth rates.
Year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2017
Bangladesh 2.47 2.15 1.96 1.49 1.12 1.12 1.05
India 2.07 1.92 1.77 1.58 1.37 1.17 1.13
Pakistan 2.91 2.52 2.28 2.05 2.08 2.05 1.95
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.
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Similarly, income support may be provided for households with handicapped
members as well, contingent on their regular health checkups, ensuring that the
handicapped members of the society receive adequate care. The introduction of cash
transfers for the disabled citizens would help mitigate the disproportionately higher
rates of poverty and illiteracy among them and allow them to combat higher rates of
unemployment than their able-bodied counterparts (Gooding & Marriot, 2009;
Mont, 2006).
Historically, female participation in the workforce has been very low (Table 13)
and as a result of this gender inequality, Pakistan loses roughly 3.73% of its HDI
value due to low female labour force participation, low literacy rates for women and
poor access to health (UNDP, 2018). Given that women constitute 49% of the total
participation, the female labour force participation rate is particularly worrying.
The data also indicate that unemployment rates are not uniform across different
income groups; however, the employment gap between the richest and poorest house-
holds has declined in the last 10 years. Table 14 shows that the gap in employment
has decreased from 3.62% in 2004–2005 to 0.9% in 2015–2016. Interestingly, female
labour force participation in the poorest 20% households has more than doubled
between 2010 and 2016; this trend is particularly encouraging given the expansion of
BISP and soft loans for women.
Table 15 splits the labour force of the country into four categories by gender:
employers, self-employed, employees and unpaid family members. The self-employed
category refers to business owners; 40.9% men and 20.4% women own their busi-
nesses A staggering 54.5% of women in the labour force work as unpaid family mem-
bers. However, this is a considerable improvement from 65% in 2008, when BISP
first started.
Table 13. Female participation and unemployment rates.











Source: Pakistan Bureau of Statistics.
Table 14. Number of employed persons in upper 20% and lowest 20% of population.
Upper 20% Lowest 20%
Years Total Male Female Total Male Female
2004–2005 21.82 18.7 3.12 18.2 14.22 3.98
2005–2006 20.31 17.05 3.26 18.79 13.76 5.03
2007–2008 20.46 17.36 3.1 18.62 13.6 5.02
2010–2011 21.58 18.21 3.37 17.43 13.47 3.96
2011–2012 20.12 17.07 3.05 18.92 13.29 5.63
2013–2014 19.8 16.48 3.32 19.15 12.87 6.28
2015–2016 19.95 10.26 9.69 19.05 7.17 11.88
Source: Household Integrated Economic Survey (HIES), various years.
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Discontinued in 2015, the Waseela-e-Haq component of BISP disbursed soft loans
to women who have graduated from 10-day skills training courses. It may be argued
that this time period is too short for any real learning to take place. Moreover, given
the low female labour participation rates justify that the loan scheme is targeted
towards women. However, expanding the scope of the program to include men from
the poorest 10% will also help alleviate poverty. To ensure that the disbursed loans
actually create a sustainable source of income for recipients, the program may intro-
duce compulsory business training courses as a condition for eligibility. The use of
microfinance not only empowers the poor and reduces poverty (Imoisi & Opara,
2014) but also leads to improvement in education and health outcomes (Simanowitz
& Walter, 2002). However, existing research shows that microfinance is better suited
for individuals close to but above the poverty line, while CCTs are more beneficial
for those living in extreme poverty (Pantelic, 2011).
4. Conclusions
Despite poor economic growth and volatile political conditions, Pakistan has been
successful in reducing its poverty statistics and cash transfer programs have aided
Pakistan’s efforts in this endeavour. The introduction of BISP has set the foundation
for an effective social protection program in Pakistan; the appropriate targeting poli-
cies of the program have allowed the program to have the intended impact on its
recipients and the introduction of the conditional components in recent years will
only help further improve the program. The program would further benefit the poor
by introducing specialised components seeking to help the widows and the disabled.
UCTs may be better suited for aiding widows and elderly living below the poverty
line and provide a financial cushion, especially in old age. They may also be used to
provide temporary short-term financial relief to the temporarily unemployed. CCTs
can be used to improve health and education outcomes; cash transfers can be made
conditional, subject to regular health check-ups for mothers and children and manda-
tory school attendance to improve these outcomes. Adopting these measures provides
a social safety net that also works towards improving illiteracy among youth and
infant and maternal health. Furthermore, soft loans and microfinance may also be
provided to individuals, contingent on their participation in a mandatory business
Table 15. Employment status by gender.
Years
Employers Self-employed Unpaid family helpers Employees
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
1999–2000 0.9 0.1 46.4 16.7 16.7 50.1 36 33.1
2001–2002 0.9 0.3 42.4 15.7 16.4 46.9 40.3 37.1
2003–2004 1.1 0.1 41.4 15.9 18.3 52.8 39.2 31.2
2005–2006 1.1 0.1 39.8 15 19.1 59.2 40 25.7
2006–2007 1 0.1 39.8 13.4 18.6 61.9 40.6 24.6
2007–2008 1.2 – 39.6 12.8 19.7 65 39.5 22.2
2008–2009 1.5 0.1 38.7 13.1 20.2 65 39.6 21.8
2009–2010 1.6 0.1 40 13.6 18.7 66.3 39.7 20
2010–2011 1.8 0.1 40.5 15.6 17.3 63.4 40.4 20.9
2012–2013 1.6 0.1 38.9 15 16.5 60.5 43 24.4
2014–2015 1.7 0.1 40.9 20.4 14.5 54.5 42.9 24.9
Source: Labour force survey, various years.
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training course. Not only does it allow for empowerment for women but by including
men in the scheme, the loans may provide means of developing sustainable incomes
for their households. The end objective of social safety nets is to aid the transition
out of poverty for individuals, which cannot be managed through dependence on
government assistance alone. Therefore, the case of Pakistan highlights the import-
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